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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the existence and nature of long-run relationships between 
Greek national income and four categories of public expenditure. Our results suggest 
that there exists a positive long-run relationship between GDP on the one hand; and 
public expenditure and “productive” public consumption on the other, with causality 
running both ways. There appears to be no long-run relationship between GDP and 
public-sector personnel expenditure; and GDP and public-debt service expenditure. 
From that point of view, it would appear that in terms of output growth, the fiscal 
policy followed by Greece during the 1975-1990 period has rather been ineffective.   
 
 
 
JEL Classification: E0, E6.  
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal policy; GDP; Public expenditure; Cointegration, Weak 
exogeneity/causality 
 
 
 
 
* Address for correspondence: Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, 
London, UB8 3PH; United Kingdom ; E-mail: Michael.Arghyrou@brunel.ac.uk; Fax No: ++01895-
203384 
 
 
I would like to thank Philip Arestis; Richard Disney; John Grahl; Marika Karanassou; Christopher 
Martin; Iannis A. Mourmouras; and two anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions. I would 
also like to thank participants in the International Economics and Finance Society Conference (City 
University, London, April 1999); and the 3rd Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis  and International 
Finance (University of Crete, Rethymno, May 1999) for useful comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
 
 1 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
The link between public expenditure and economic growth has attracted considerable 
interest on the part of economic researchers both in the theoretical as well as in the 
empirical level. Roughly speaking, one may distinguish between two opposing views: 
On the one hand, there is the Keynesian approach according to which government 
spending is an important policy tool to be used to ensure a reasonable level of 
economic activity; correct short-term cyclical fluctuations in aggregate expenditure 
(Singh and Sahni, 1984); and secure an increase in productive investment, thus 
providing a socially optimal direction for growth and development (Ram, 1986). The 
opposite view is that excessive state intervention in economic life affects growth 
performance in a negative way for two reasons: First, because government operations 
are often conducted less inefficiently, hence they reduce the overall productivity of 
the economic system; and second because excessive government expenditure (usually 
accompanied by high taxation levels) distorts economic incentives and results in sub-
optimal economic decisions (see e.g. Barro 1990 and King and Rebelo 1990). On the 
basis of the above, it is clear that in terms of designing economic policy, the question 
as to where exactly the truth lies is an important one. Empirical evidence on the 
subject is mixed. Studies like the one by Ram (1986) conclude that the overall impact 
of government size on economic growth is positive. On the other hand, studies like 
the ones by Barro (1990 and 1991) reach the opposite conclusion.  
 
This paper aims to shed some further empirical light on the issue of public 
expenditure’s ability to promote economic growth by focusing on the experience of a 
small, open economy, namely the one of Greece. The latter is a particularly interesting 
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case study because it experienced a major increase in public expenditure during the 
period 1975-19901. The additional spending undertaken by Greek authorities was 
partly financed through higher taxation revenue but the its main part was financed 
though increased government borrowing. As a result, Greek budget deficit and public 
debt (in terms of percentage in GDP) recorded significant increases (see Figures 1 and 
2). Figure 3 reveals the nature of the extra government spending. Its biggest part was 
devoted to higher personnel wages and, as public debt was increasing, expenditure for 
servicing public debt (i.e. amortization and interest payments). In this paper we aim to 
acquire insights regarding the output effects of these fiscal developments by means of 
examining the existence and nature of long-run relationships between Greek national 
income and the categories of public expenditure represented in Figure 3. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical 
background on which our empirical analysis is based. Section 3 presents the 
methodology used and our econometric results. Section 4 discusses the post-1975 
fiscal policy of Greece in the light of the results obtained in section 3. Section 5 
summarises and offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. THEORETICAL BACKROUND  
 
The long-run relationship between real output and public expenditure has attracted 
considerable attention in economic research. In particular, the ability of public 
expenditure to influence national income is questioned in two levels. First, the nature 
of the causality pattern is disputed: a number of public finance studies adopt the 
Wagner’s law approach which states that national income causes public expenditure, 
                                                                 
1 For an overview of recent fiscal developments in Greece see Christodoulakis, 1994. 
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mainly through an increase in demand for public services. Within this framework, 
public expenditure is treated as a behavioural variable, similar to private consumption. 
On the other hand, a number of macroeconomic models adopt a view closer to the 
Keynesian doctrine according to which public expenditure is an important policy tool 
able to influence the level of equilibrium output. As Singh and Sahni (1984 p.630) 
argue, if the causality pattern were Wagnerian, public expenditure is delegated to a 
passive role, if Keynesian it acquires the status of an important policy variable.  
 
Second, even if we exclude the possibility of a causality pattern running from national 
income to public expenditure, it is not quite clear that increased public outlays will 
have lasting positive output effects. Postulating a fixed level of taxation revenue, 
authorities have two options to finance a higher level of public expenditure: either to 
monetize (accommodate) or/and to bond-finance the expansion. Under a medium-
term upward-sloping aggregated supply schedule, the output implications of the fiscal 
expansion would have to be studied within a Barro-Gordon (1983) set-up. Money-
financed deficits would cause positive output effects only if they remain unanticipated 
by the private sector. Repeated and predictable monetary accommodation of deficits 
would result in a higher inflation rate without any long-run output gain. By resulting 
in a higher inflation rate, money-financed budget deficits could then imply real costs 
for the economy through the well-documented real costs of inflation. On the other 
hand, bond-financed public expenditure may involve expansionary effects of a more 
lasting nature provided that the anticipation of future interest payments causes 
positive wealth effects on current and future consumption (see e.g. Blinder and 
Solow, 1973). However, such outcomes may be mitigated by crowing-out effects 
which can take place through two channels. First, through portfolio effects: an 
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increase in the stock of bonds may necessitate a similar increase in interest rates to 
maintain equilibrium in the bonds’ market. Such an increase may imply a shift of the 
LM curve (to the left), which could reduce the expansionary impact of the bond-
financed deficit. Second, through an upwards-sloping aggregate supply curve: given a 
certain level of nominal money, increasing prices caused by a fiscal expansion would 
lead to a reduction in real money stock. That would cause an increase in interest rates 
and negative wealth effects reducing private investment and consumption. By causing 
an increase in interest rates, bond-financed deficits may actually result in a worse 
inflation performance than money-financed deficits in the lines suggested by Sargent 
and Wallace (1981)2. Finally, a bond-financed budget deficit would have no 
expansionary effects at all (not even in the short-run) if the Ricardian Equivalence 
hypothesis were valid3.  
 
More recently, the role of public expenditure as an output-promoting control variable 
has been highlighted in the framework of the endogenous growth literature pioneered 
by the seminal papers by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). Endogenous growth 
models postulate that the economy’s output is conditioned not only on the level of 
physical capital and labour stock (as it was the case in Solow’s (1956) neoclassical 
growth model) but also on additional production factors which may enter the 
production function with constant returns to scale alone. If this is the case, returns on 
                                                                 
2 A substantial increase in interest rates leads to a violation of the government’s solvency condition, in 
which case the central bank is expected to increase seignorage revenue in the future. The increase in 
expected inflation may then lead to an increase in actual inflation.  
3 However, empirical evidence in favour of the Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis is at best mixed (see 
e.g. Poterba and Summers, 1987) and the validity of the views expressed by its supporters have been 
questioned on various grounds. First, the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is based on the assumption 
of a tax system involving lump -sum taxation. Second, in reality, tax-payers have finite life horizons 
and may not want to leave bequests to future generations. Third, there are agents who face borrowing 
constraints and, in the event of a reduction in taxation (causing a bond-financed deficit), would prefer 
to increase their consumption instead of their savings. Finally, agents may not be perfectly rational and 
may not be able to grasp the future implications of increased pubic borrowing. 
 5 
investment on such production factors need not diminish as the stock of the latter 
increases, and growth differences among nations may persist indefinitely if the rate of 
accumulation of the specific productions factor differs from country to country4. A 
number of variables have been proposed to exhibit constant returns to scale alone with 
spending on public infrastructure being one of them (see Aschauer, 1989). Public 
expenditure on education may also improve growth performance by promoting human 
capital accumulation  (see e.g. Mankiw et al, 1992). Finally, both public expenditure 
on education and public expenditure on infrastructure may be responsible for the 
creation of positive externalities with potentially important output implications. 
However, the endogenous growth models framework has also been used to highlight 
possibly harmful effects of excessive government spending. For example, it has been 
suggested (see King and Rebelo, 1990) that if increased public expenditure is 
financed through higher taxation the economy may end in a “development trap” and 
pay a significant welfare cost as a result of distortions affecting economic incentives. 
A similar result is reached by Barro (1990) who argues that tax-financed increases in 
“non-productive” public expenditure lowers the economy’s saving rate and, 
ultimately, the economy’s equilibrium growth rate.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY, DATA AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
In this section we investigate the existence of a long-run relationship between real 
Greek GDP on the one hand; and a set of Greek public expenditure categories 
expressed in real terms on the other5. We consider four categories of budget outlays: 
public investment expenditure (GI); personnel expenses (W); public debt service 
                                                                 
4 For a review of endogenous growth theory  see, among others, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  
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expenditure i.e. interest and amortization payments (GC-B); and the remaining part of 
public expenditure (GC-P). This fourth category roughly corresponds to “productive” 
public consumption (as opposed to what Barro (1991) defines as “non-productive” 
public expenditure) and includes agricultural grants; tax rebates; industrial and other 
corporate subsidies; payments for corporate loans whose repayment the Greek state 
has guaranteed; “third-parties revenue rebates”; payments to EU; and “remaining 
expenditure”. Our analysis is based on annual data taken from the data bank of the 
Bank of Greece. Our sample covers the period 1960/1998, a total of 39 observations6. 
Our econometric approach follows a two-step logic: First, we investigate the existence 
of a long-run relationship between the logarithms of each of the four government 
expenditure categories and the logarithm of real Greek GDP. Second, for those cases 
for which the cointegration hypothesis is not rejected, we undertake weak exogeneity 
analysis in order to get indications regarding the direction of causality in the Granger 
sense7.  
  
We start by investigating the stationarity properties of the variables involved in the 
analysis using the (Augmented) Dickey-Fuller (1979) unit root tests. As far as the 
logarithms of the variables are concerned, we tested the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity against the alternative that the series are trend-stationary. The estimated 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
5 We compute real values by means of dividing nominal values by the consumer price index. The data 
source for the latter is the IFS databank provided by Datastream.  
6 It is clear that since our analysis makes use of a certain number of asymptotic tests (see below), a 
bigger sample would be preferable. However, we have little choice than to work within the limitations 
imposed by our data set and interpret our results with the appropriate caution.  
7 A comment regarding the limitations of the Granger causality analysis is due here. Granger’s 
definition of causality suggests that if past and present values of yt provide useful information to 
forecast xt+1 at time t, then it is said that yt Granger causes xt. From that point of view, strictly speaking, 
a better term for Granger causality would be precedence. Hence, the term “Granger causality” should 
not be used unconditionally to imply causality in the sense the latter is commonly understood (see 
Maddala and Kim, 1998). In particular, in the framework of bivariate analysis, Granger causality 
analysis may well lead to spurious causality results as a result of the omission of other variables. 
However, if Granger causality analysis is undertaken in a bivariate framework supported by theoretical 
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ADF statistics suggested that all variables include a unit root. In contrast, their first 
differences appear to be stationary8. We proceed by applying Johansen’s (1988) 
cointegration methodology. Since the latter is widely used in empirical research, we 
will not discuss its technical characteristics here. As a first step, the order of the 
underlying VAR models to be used in the cointegration analysis has to be specified. 
For each category of expenditure, we examined three different lag structures, ranging 
from one to three lagged values for each variable. In all estimated systems (with the 
exception of those referring to GC-B) we faced mispecification problems of one form 
of another, particularly residual non-normality. In order to overcome the problem we 
tested the statistical significance of a number of dummy variables, aiming to capture 
the impact of shocks which might be responsible for non-normality. Out of the cases 
examined, two proved statistically significant. The first, D1974, refers to year 1974 
when Greece experienced political shocks of various forms and the international 
economic environment was still very much affected by the first oil shock. The second, 
D1980, refers to year 1980, a year that the Greek economy faced another recession 
and the international economic environment was under the influence of the second oil 
shock. The inclusion of these dummies as unrestricted variables (not entering the 
cointegration space) allowed the acquisition of Gaussian errors and yielded well-
specified systems (see below)9.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
background, as it is the case between public expenditure and national income (see section 2 above), one 
can legitimately use the results (in a cautious way of course) for inference purposes.  
8 Due to space limitations, the results of the ADF tests are not presented here. They are available by the 
author upon request.  
9 Acquiring Gaussian errors by means of adding dummy variables other than centred seasonal ones 
may sometimes by costly as the extra dummies will affect the underlying distribution of cointegrating 
rank statistics. In that case the power of the cointegration tests is reduced and the published critical 
values will only be indicative (see Harris 1995, p. 81). However, in our case there are two factors 
which make us believe that our results are robust. First, even without these dummies, the nature of the 
results of the cointegration analysis which follows remained unchanged. Second, even when the 
dummies are included in the system, the existence of one cointegrating vector for the cases the 
cointegration hypothesis is not rejected is statistically significant at the 1% level; whereas the values of 
the trace and maximal eigenvalue testing for different cointegration ranks are way apart the critical 
values.  
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The next issue raised in the process of formulation of the underlying VAR system is 
whether or not determenistic terms like a constant and a trend should enter the short 
and/or long-run models. To answer the question, we use the Pantula principle (see 
Johansen 1992)10, i.e. a number of joint hypotheses tests testing simultaneously both 
the number of cointegrating relationships among the variables and the existence of 
determenistic components. More specifically, for each category of public expenditure 
considered, three models are estimated. The most restrictive (named Model 2) 
assumes no linear trends in the levels of the data, i.e. an intercept which is restricted 
to the cointegration space. The second (named Model 3) assumes the existence of 
linear trends in the levels of the data, implying an intercept both in the long-run model 
as well as in the short run model. The two intercepts, when combined, leave only a 
constant in the short-run model. Finally, the least restrictive model (named Model 4), 
assumes the existence of some long-run linear growth which the model specification 
cannot account for, i.e. the existence of a trend term restricted to the cointegration 
space. The Pantula principle involves the estimation of all three models and the 
presentation of the results from the most restrictive hypothesis (i.e. r = number of 
cointegrating relations = 0 and Model 2) through the least restrictive hypothesis, i.e. r 
= number of variables entering the VAR –1 = n –1 and Model 4). The model selection 
procedure comprises of moving across the rows of the upper half of each Table, from 
the most restrictive model towards the least restrictive one, and stoping when the null 
hypothesis is not rejected for the first time.  
 
The results referring to public investment (GI) appear in Table 1; to personnel 
expenditure (W) in Table 2; to public debt service expenditures (GC-B) in Table 3; 
                                                                 
10 See also Harris, 1995, pp. 96-97.  
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and to the expenditure category defined as GC-P in Table 4. According to the Pantula 
principle, for public investment (GI) and the category defined as GC-P both the rank 
(lmax) and the trace (ltrace) statistics show that the null hypothesis is for the first time 
not rejected for r =1 in model 2, suggesting the existence of one cointegrating 
(positive) relationship between each of these variables and real GDP together with the 
existence of a constant, restricted in the cointegration space. In the case of personnel 
expenditure (W) and public debt service expenditure (GC-B) the null hypothesis is for 
the first time not rejectd for r =0 in model 3, suggesting the absence of cointegration 
between each of these two variables and GDP. All systems and all individual 
equations pass the necessary mispecification tests. Finally, for the pair of variables for 
which the hypothesis of cointegration was not rejected (i.e. GI/GDP and GC-P/GDP), 
we proceed to weak exogeneity analysis using the long-run weak exogeneity LR tests 
proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1992). These consist of testing zero restrictions 
on the elements of the alpha matrix (i.e. the matrix of coefficients of the speed of 
adjustment to long-run equilibrium) embedded in the estimated Vector Error 
Correction Model. In both cases the LR test statistics show that none of the variables 
is weakly exogenous to the system. In other words, the results suggest a two-way 
causality pattern between GDP on the one hand; and public investment and 
“productive” public consumption on the other.  
 
4. POST-1960 GREEK FISCAL POLICY: AN ASESSMENT  
 
The results reached in the previous section concerning public investment confirm the 
validity of the importance and the growth-inducing properties attached to this 
particular kind of public expenditure. Hence, from a long-run perspective, the 
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stagnation (or even slight reduction) of the share of public investment in Greek GDP 
which was observed after 1975 (see Figure 3) and the financing of a number of small 
and medium-sized projects rather than major infrastructure ones (a fact well-
documented in the study by Alogoskoufis and Prodromidis, 1995), may not be 
considered an optimal fiscal policy choice. In the same spirit, the major public 
infrastructure projects currently under construction may boost future Greek economic 
performance. 
 
Turning now to the examination of the results referring to what we have termed 
“productive” public consumption (GC-P), it appears that in the past, categories of 
expenditure like industrial and agricultural subsidies or tax rebates have been 
conducive to Greek economic growth (although causality seems to run both ways). 
This result is not surprising given that our data sample extends back to 1960, i.e. it 
includes a long period during which the Greek economy was largely dependent on 
agricultural production and Greek industrial firms were enjoying preferential 
subsidies treatment relative to their EU counterparts11. In the framework of limited 
international competition both in the domestic and foreign markets, government 
expenditure on agricultural and industrial subsidies were giving Greek firms a 
competitive edge and were boosting Greek national income12. Having said that, it 
would be rather hazardous to jump into the conclusion that such a policy, if applied 
today, would necessarily be conducive to future economic growth. The truth of the 
                                                                 
11 During the period 1961-1980, Greece was linked to the EU with an Association Agreement which on 
the one hand allowed her to keep its market relatively close to European products competitive to the 
products of Greek industries and, at the same time, gave Greek products preferential tariff and quota 
treatment in the EU markets. When Greece joined the EU in 1981 it was given a transition period 
extending up to 1989 to bring its industrial policy in line with EU regulations. Hence, for almost a 
decade after its EU accession, Greece was allowed to grant financial assistance to its industrial firms.  
12 Alogoskoufis (1995) shares this opinion. He terms the economic regime established in Greece after 
World War II “state corporatism” and argues that in the fifties, sixties and the best part of the 1970s 
this model of economic organization suceeded in delivering economic development.  
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matter is that the present international economic environment is much more 
globalised and Greece is much more open to foreign competition than what it used to 
be in the 1960s or even the 1980s. There exists evidence indicating that since 1981 the 
competitiveness of Greek agricultural and industrial products relative to those of 
Greece’s main trading partners has been declining (see Arghyrou, 2000), despite the 
fact that for much of this period Greek producers retained some form of preferential 
treatment compared to their foreign competitors in the domestic market. There is no 
guarantee that state financial assistance alone will be enough to restore the observed 
competitiveness losses. Hence, our results reached in Section 3 are more relevant in 
answering questions of the form “did state financial support to domestic firms 
promote Greek economic growth in the past” rather than “will state financial support 
to domestic supporters promote Greek economic growth in the future”.  
 
To turn now to the remaining two categories of public expenditure, the results 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 reject the cointegration hypothesis, and consequently, the 
hypothesis that an increase in personnel wages and public debt service expenditure 
leads to an increase in Greek national income. From that point of view, it would 
appear that in terms of output growth, the fiscal policy which was followed after 1975 
(whose main characteristic was a significant increase in these two categories) has 
rather been ineffective. There appears to be little evidence in favour of a Ricardian 
Equivalence explanation to support this conclusion. In contrast, the post-1975 decline 
in the share of private investment in GDP suggests that crowding-out effects may 
have taken place (see Figure 4). The historic movements of real interest rates (which 
assumed low, and some times even negative, values during the 1980s) do not suggest 
that crowding effects were caused by money market adjustments, at least not before 
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the beginning of the 1990s13. Alternative explanations for the apparent failure of the 
private sector to increase its investment expenditure in the face of government-led 
increased aggregate demand include the following: 
 
First, the conditions of credit-rationing in which the private sector had to operate after 
1975. The declining saving’s ratio of the economy together with increased credit to 
the public sector (see Figure 5) made possible by the conditions of financial 
regulation prevailing in Greece before 1990 meant that the private sector was 
deprived the necessary funds to proceed to the investment needed to expand its 
production capacity. Second, the well-known “time to build” problem, i.e. the existing 
lags in the investment process. In the framework of a small, open economy like 
Greece where the industrial base was rather limited and the propensity to imports 
quite high (see Arghyrou, 2000) it may suggested that the increased demand was 
largely directed to imports of goods for which domestic production was either limited 
or not existent (e.g. durable goods). This argument appears to be particularly relevant 
during the early 1980s when fiscal expansion was quite pronounced, Greece had just 
joined the EU and a reduction in trade barriers was gradually taking place (see Figure 
5). Third, the possible adverse impact of increasing budget deficits on inflation which 
may have resulted to the inflation costs mentioned in section 214. Fourth, as suggested 
by Halikias (1996), the negative impact of increased taxation and government 
intervention on economic incentives and production efficiency; and the negative 
                                                                 
13 This is not too surprising, given the fact that public securities were not available to the non-bank 
private sector before 1987; and that financial regulation kept the level of nominal interest rates under 
the control of the government until the early 1990s. 
14 Of course, the hypothesis that budget deficits have led to a higher rate of actual inflation is a testable 
one and could well constitute the topic of another paper. However, at this stage it may be useful to note 
that in a paper dealing with monetary policy in Greece, Alogoskoufis and Philippopoulos (1992) 
estimate that inflation expectations and actual average inflation rate in Greece during the period 1972-
89 was higher than during the period 1958-71. 
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impact of the widening fiscal imbalances on the private sector’s expectations 
regarding the future macroeconomic performance of the country.  
 
All in all, it would appear that the post-1975 fiscal expansion did not result in any 
lasting welfare improvement for the Greek economy but created a number of serious 
fiscal problems whose full significance was realized after 1987, when the process of 
financial liberalization was initiated and, as a result, interest rates on public securities 
increased substantially, assuming values exceeding the rate of growth of the economy. 
This put public debt on an explosive, non-sustainable path which brought Greece on 
the brink of insolvency at the beginning of the 1990s (see Alogoskoufis and 
Christodoulakis, 1991). As a result, in the 1990s the Greek authorities were obliged to 
dedicate to the debt’s service a very significant percentage of public revenues (see 
Figure 3) and take unpopular steps aiming to reverse its dynamics. In short, on the 
basis the results reached in Section 3, one might say that the fiscal policy applied in 
Greece between 1975-90 appears to have operated as a mechanism of intertemporal 
shifting of consumption without any apparent long-run output gains.  
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
This paper has attempted to shed some further empirical light on the issue of the link 
between public expenditure and national income. In particular, we have examined the 
role of four categories of public expenditure in terms of promoting real GDP in Greece. 
Our results suggest that increases in “non-productive” Greek public consumption and 
personnel expenditure are not followed by increases in Greek GDP. On the other hand, 
public investment spending appears to be linked to Greek GDP with a positive long-run 
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relationship where causality runs both ways. The same applies for “productive” public 
consumption, although we argued that given the fundamental changes in the Greek and 
international economic environment which have occurred over the past decade, this 
result does not necessarily imply that expenditure like industrial and agricultural 
subsidies will display in the future the same income-inducing properties they have 
displayed in the past.  
 
On the basis of our results, we discussed the implications of the major fiscal expansion 
undertaken by Greece between 1975 and 1990. Given the fact that this was mainly 
directed to personnel and “non-productive” public consumption purposes, we argued 
that that in terms of output growth, the expansion has rather been ineffective and may 
have contributed, through various channels, to the prolonged economic stagnation out of 
which Greece has started recovering only recently. From that point of view, the fiscal 
consolidation effort which was initiated in 1990 and intensified since 1995 is a positive 
development. Having said that, one might argue that there certainly exists scope for 
further restructuring of the Greek public sector. Elsewhere (see Mourmouras and 
Arghyrou, 2000), we argue that over the last ten years, the stabilization/convergence 
effort of Greece in the 1990s attached an excessively high weight to monetary policy and 
postponed long-overdue adjustments in the field of fiscal policy. In this framework, the 
consensus which now seems to have emerged in Greece regarding the necessity of 
restructuring the Greek public sector and the recent implementation of relevant policy 
measures (e.g. privatization of certain loss-making state-owned firms, opening of 
markets previously reserved for state monopolies etc.) may be creating conditions for a 
better growth performance in the future.  
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Table 1 
      
JOINT TESTS FOR DETERMENISTIC COMPONENTS AND COINTEGRATING RANK:  
THE PANTULA PRINCIPLE 
      
      
H0 r n-r Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
      
lmax  test  0 2 50.1 22.39 23.07 
 1 1 9.00+ 6.80 7.352 
      
ltrace  test  0 2 59.11 29.2 28.82 
 1 1 9.00+ 6.80 6.96 
      
+ indicates the first time the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 
 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS: Model 2  
 
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + Y  Dt                                      z ¢¢ = [constant  GDP  GI] , D ¢¢ t = [D1974  D1980   ] 
 
Mispecification tests: individual equations 
 
GDP: Portmanteau 5 lags  8.738 
GI: Portmanteau 5 lags  6.852 
GDP: AR autocorrelation   1.650 
GI: AR autocorrelation  2.448 
GDP: Normality c2  0.725 
GI: Normality c2  0.726 
GDP: ARCH 0.423 
GI: ARCH 0.678 
GDP: c2 heteroscedasticity 1.089 
GI: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.665 
 
System mispecification tests 
 
Vector portmanteau 20.592 
Vector AR autocorrelation 1.354 
Vector Normality c2 1.084 
Vector c2 heteroscedasticity 1.143 
      
DETERMINATION OF COINTEGRATING RANK  
      
H0 H1 LR statistic 95% CV Trace statistic 95% CV  
      
r = 0 r = 1  50.01** 15.7 59.11** 20.0 
r £ 1 r = 2  9.008 9.2 9.008 9.2 
     
Standardized beta¢ eigenvectors      
  GDP GI Constant  
      
  1.000 -0.174 -4.0150  
  -1.2039 1.000 2.2660  
      
    
    
RESTRICTED COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS    
      
H0: a1 = 0  (GDP weakly exogenous) 
 
LR-test, rank =1, c2 (1) = 41.045** 
H0: a2 = 0  (GI weakly exogenous) 
 
LR-test, rank =1, c2 (1) = 9.399** 
      
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level  
** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level 
      
 
Cointegration analysis: GDP and Public Investment (GI) 
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Table 2 
      
JOINT TESTS FOR DETERMENISTIC COMPONENTS AND COINTEGRATING RANK:  
THE PANTULA PRINCIPLE 
      
      
H0 r n-r Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
      
lmax  test  0 2 20.48 12.68+ 14.75 
 1 1 0.463 0.189 1.68 
      
ltrace  test  0 2 20.94 12.87+ 16.43 
 1 1 0.463 0.189 1.68 
      
+ indicates the first time  the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 
 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS: Model 3  
 
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + A2 zt-2  + Y  Dt                                      z ¢¢ = [GDP  WI] , D ¢¢ t = [constant] 
 
Mispecification tests: individual equations 
 
GDP: Portmanteau 5  lags  9.481 
W : Portmanteau 5 lags  4.938 
GDP: AR autocorrelation   0.863 
W: AR autocorrelation  0.988 
GDP: Normality c2  0.408 
W: Normality c2  0.390 
GDP: ARCH  1.528 
W: ARCH  0.228 
GDP: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.989 
W: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.957 
 
System mispecification tests 
 
Vector portmanteau 20.782 
Vector AR autocorrelation 0.821 
Vector Normality c2 0.516 
Vector c2 heteroscedasticity 0.857 
      
DETERMINATION OF COINTEGRATING RANK  
      
H0 H1 LR statistic 95% CV Trace statistic 95% CV  
      
r = 0 r = 1  12.68 14.1 12.87 15.4 
r £ 1 r = 2  0.169 3.8 0.189 3.8 
     
      
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level  
** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level 
      
 
Cointegration analysis: GDP and public expenditure for personnel wages (W) 
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Table 3 
 
      
JOINT TESTS FOR DETERMENISTIC COMPONENTS AND COINTEGRATING RANK:  
THE PANTULA PRINCIPLE 
      
      
H0 r n-r Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
      
lmax  test  0 2 19.09 12.31+ 12.47 
 1 1 2.055 0.737 8.615 
      
ltrace  test  0 2 18.86 13.05+ 18.8 
 1 1 1.833 0.737 7.684 
      
+ indicates the first time the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 
 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS: Model 3  
 
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + A2 zt-2  + Y  Dt                                      z ¢¢ = [GDP  GC-B] , D ¢¢ t = [constant] 
 
Mispecification tests: individual equations 
 
GDP: Portmanteau 5 lags  6.441 
GC-B : Portmanteau 5 lags  0.752 
GDP: AR autocorrelation   2.225 
GC-B: AR autocorrelation  0.239 
GDP: Normality c2  3.368 
GC-B: Normality c2  2.233 
GDP: ARCH  0.999 
GC-B: ARCH 0.315 
GDP: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.791 
GC-B: c2 heteroscedasticity 1.372 
 
System mispecification tests 
 
Vector portmanteau 12.27 
Vector AR autocorrelation 1.359 
Vector Normality c2 5.570 
Vector c2 heteroscedasticity 0.897 
      
DETERMINATION OF COINTEGRATING RANK  
      
H0 H1 LR statistic 95% CV Trace statistic 95% CV  
      
r = 0 r = 1  12.31 14.1 13.05 15.4 
r £ 1 r = 2  0.737 3.8 0.737 3.8 
     
      
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level  
** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level 
      
 
Cointegration analysis: GDP and public-debt service expenditure (GC-B) 
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Table 4 
      
JOINT TESTS FOR DETERMENISTIC COMPONENTS AND COINTEGRATING RANK:  
THE PANTULA PRINCIPLE 
      
      
H0 r n-r Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  
      
lmax  test  0 2 48.5 41.65 41.79 
 1 1 1.226+ 0.937 1.229 
      
ltrace  test  0 2 49.73 42.59 43.02 
 1 1 1.226+ 0.937 1.229 
      
+ indicates the first time the null hypothesis is not rejected 
 
 
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS: Model 2  
 
VAR estimated: zt = A1 zt-1 + Y  Dt                                      z ¢¢ = [constant  GDP  GI] , D ¢¢ t = [D1974  D1980   ] 
 
Mispecification tests: individual equations 
 
GDP: Portmanteau 5 lags  4.418 
GI: Portmanteau 5 lags  2.422 
GDP: AR autocorrelation   2.310 
GI: AR autocorre lation  1.299 
GDP: Normality c2  0.117 
GI: Normality c2  0.763 
GDP: ARCH 2.495 
GI: ARCH 0.645 
GDP: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.848 
GI: c2 heteroscedasticity 0.479 
 
System mispecification tests 
 
Vector portmanteau 11.781 
Vector AR autocorrelation 0.977 
Vector Normality c2 1.239 
Vector c2 heteroscedasticity 0.588 
      
DETERMINATION OF COINTEGRATING RANK  
      
H0 H1 LR statistic 95% CV Trace statistic 95% CV  
      
r = 0 r = 1  48.5** 15.7 49.73** 20.0 
r £ 1 r = 2  1.226 9.2 1.226 9.2 
     
Standardized beta¢ eigenvectors      
  GDP GI Constant  
      
  1.000 -1.0501 -0.7188  
  -1.690 1.000 4.042  
      
    
    
RESTRICTED COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS    
      
H0: a1 = 0  (GDP weakly exogenous) 
 
LR-test, rank =1, c2 (1) = 16.76** 
H0: a2 = 0  (GC-P weakly exogenous) 
 
LR-test, rank =1, c2 (1) = 34.665** 
      
*   Rejects the null hypothesis at the 5% level  
** Rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level 
      
 
Cointegration analysis: GDP and “productive” public consumption expenditure (GC-P) 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Budget deficit (% in GDP) 
Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix  
 
Figure 2 
 
Public debt (% in GDP) 
Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix 
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Figure 3 
 
Public expenditure (% in GDP) 
GI = Government Investment  
W = Personnel Wages  
GC-B = Public debt service expenditure 
GC-P = Residual spending:“Productive” public consumption  
 
Source: Bank of Greece, The Greek Economy 1960-1997, Long-term macroeconomic time series, 
Athens 1998 and Report of the Governor for year 1998.  
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Figure 4  
 
Gross fixed capital formation and private saving (% in GDP) 
Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix  
 
 
Figure 5 
 
 
 
Imports and credit to public sector (% in GDP) 
Source: European Economy No 64, Statistical Appendix and Bank of Greece, Monthly Statistical 
Bulletin (various editions).  
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